GESCHICHTE DER FLUGSICHERUNG

South Germany’s Upper Airspace Structure and Route Network

The new dividing line between lower and upper airspace was set at 20.000 feet MSL. Frankfurt flight information region (FIR) was divided between the FIR and the UIR. FL 195 or 19.500 feet of altitude was only used for VFR flight. It should be noted that during those times standard vertical separation for flight above FL 400 was 3000 feet, whereas 2000 feet had to be applied between FL 290 and 400. The reason was the given inaccuracy of aircraft altimeters.

In considering the development of the area of responsibility of Rhein UAC one must look back to the years of the US Occupation Zone before the three German flight information regions (FIR) were established. During the late 40’ies and until the establishment of BFS in 1953 most flight movements were conducted at altitudes up to 20.000 feet and controlled by the RAF in the North (British Zone), by the Soviets in the East (Russian Zone), by USAF and the US Army in the South and Southeast (US Zone) and by the FAF in the Southwest (French Zone).

Before 1960 and for all practical purposes this left all airspace above 20.000 feet for flight operations, such as air defence and other military training missions with jet-type aircraft, under air defence units. In the formerly still uncontrolled upper airspace USAFE and the FAF provided direction finder, flight information and radar direction services until 1957. As of June 1957 Rhein Control assumed the role of providing air traffic control (ATC) and flight information service (FIS).

Parts of the CTA still consisted of Advisory Routes (ADR) and the ADIZ covered only South Germany. As of January 1960 this whole area was designated as Frankfurt UIR with an embedded UTA between 20.000 and 25.000 feet and Rhein Control provided ATC and FIS to all civil and military flights in this airspace. With civil turbo-prop aircraft appearing on the sky a few years later ICAO concluded in 1958 on the establishment of FIRs and UIRs in differentiating between lower and upper airspace and corresponding route networks, formed by airways, advisory and predetermined routes (ICAO EUM Conference 1958).

Meanwhile BFS, three FIRs and two UIRs (Hannover and Frankfurt) existed and Germany had regained limited sovereignty (1955). By that time the lower airspace had been fairly well regulated in accordance with ICAO rules. The upper airspace, however, remained practically unregulated until NATO/CEAC and ICAO agreed on the official implementation of upper control areas (UTA) and the network of predetermined routes (PDR) in 1959. But the civil airspace users were not satisfied at all and so ICAO’s VI European & Mediterranean Regional Air Navigation Conference dealt with the matter again.

The meeting concluded that ATC should be provided in all those circumstances where this service is required. States having responsibility for ATS routes should provide controlled ATS routes and the relevant ground facilities (navaids) needed for navigation. The ATS system should be devised so as to provide for the least number of FIRs and related CTAs with realistic operating conditions, be procedurally “fail safe”, provide for the safe and expeditious handling of air traffic, assign responsibility to a single authority to provide ATS within any delineated area. Controlled airspace should be established to encompass the entire en-route portion of IFR flights. Air Traffic Advisory Service should only be considered as a temporary expedient.

Read More:
German Air Traffic Control During The Cold War
The Story of Rhein Control
Vol 3, The Operation of ATC in South Germany's Upper Airspace 1957-1977
https://www.amazon.de/dp/1536994391

Civil and Military Air Traffic

In March 1957 the 1820th AACS Group reported an average of 10 civil flights per day. Complete records on the traffic in 1957 no longer exist, but other reports mention 96 civil and 631 military flights on one day, 4.839 IFR training flights above 20.000 feet in April, 5.277 in May and 4.919 in June, an overall number of about 65.000 flights annually for 1957.

Typical traffic situations occurred mainly during the morning hours up to 1200 hours, during afternoon hours after 1330 hours and in the early evening hours until 2300 hours local time, all normally lasting for two to three hours in duration. The normal split between general (GAT) and operational (OAT) air traffic during those years was 80 % for OAT and 20 % for GAT. This relation remained unchanged for a long time and began to differ significantly for GAT as of 1967, which rose to 60% in 1968, mainly due to the military flights now often conducted without any air traffic service provision or under Non – ATS military radar stations. In 1968 over 100 different civil airlines operated in the upper airspace. Military traffic was originated mainly by USAFE, GAF, GNY, RAF, RCAF, BAF, RNAF, RDAF, FAF and the IAF. During 29 May 1967, for instance, 54 flights were under control and in radio contact with Rhein UAC within a 15 minute period, handled by two controllers only.

Air Defense as Rhein Control’s Partner

The Air Defence organization under the 4th Allied Tactical Air Force (ATAF) for the south of Germany was a closely related partner of Rhein UAC, with Rhein Control having evolved from its forerunner, the 619th TCS, which was part of the air defence system. The separation between the air defence and the air traffic services (ATS) organizations in this portion of the upper airspace only became permanent reality with the establishment of Rhein UAC in 1957. Since then practically two groups of service providers existed for military flights, one in providing “radar direction services” (Flugmelde- und Leitdienst = Aircraft Control & Warning) to certain tactical OAT (ORA, and OAT/CR) flights and the other in providing “air traffic services” to OAT and non-OAT flights, with the latter, again, consisting of civil and military flights.

As regards the ICAO ATS two organizations existed, namely the one under the mandate of BFS, running civil ATS units and owning the airspace, and the other under the mandate of the Federal Armed and the Stationary (NATO) Forces, running military ATS units. Altogether four parties operated within one and the same airspace. In West Germany after 4/59 this resulted in the provision of ATS (ATC, FIS, ALRS) at military air bases of the Federal Armed Forces and their associated CTRs and MTMAs, while Rhein UAC was the provider of area control service.

Until 1977 the ATS at the civil international and regional airports were provided by BFS, and all traffic en-route was provided ATS by the three ACCs of BFS at Hannover, Frankfurt and München in the lower airspace. In the upper airspace above 19.500 feet the ATS (ACC, FIS and ALRS) were provided by Hannover and Rhein UACs. With the move of the UAC to Karlsruhe this situation changed for Rhein UIR traffic.

The counterpart of the „ATS systems“ in accordance with the standards of ICAO are the „Air Defence Systems“ as first operated by the Stationary Forces under NATO command (RAF, USAF and FAF / CAF). As regards West Germany the air defence organization operated three sector operations centres (SOC) and altogether ten control and reporting centres and posts (CRC / CRP).

BFS units under the law on BFS and the ICAO Convention were entitled to handle all types of traffic, civil or military, GAT, OAT or security, whereas the later military “area control” units were only entitled to handle OAT flights. The picture only changed, when the FRG in 1965 transferred its mandate for the handling of traffic in the upper airspace to EUROCONTROL, which was only allowed to handle GAT flights due to its status as a supra-national organization. It remains to be a question if the delegation of jurisdiction over the UIRs from BFS to EUROCONTROL did not actually constitute a “state to state agreement” over the national airspace.

The Role of the German Air Force at Rhein UAC

This partnership between BFS and the GAF over the past 20 years varied significantly in form dependent on the external parties involved. In 1957, when Rhein Control was established as a USAFE ATS unit the local parties were USAFE with the 619th TCS and the 7424th SUPPRON, BFS and the GAF with their personnel detachments and superior organizations, being 17th Air Force and headquarters USAFE (ADVON), BFS headquarters and the MoT, and the Telecommunications (Signal) Regiment 12 of the GAF and their MoD.

In North Germany’s upper airspace (Hannover UIR) Area Control (ATC) and Flight Information Services were first provided by the RAF as “Hannover Military” for military flights (later on OAT) in cooperation with Hannover UAC/UIC as “Hannover Control / Information” for all civil (later GAT) flights at a co-located unit, Hannover ACC as of 1955. In South Germany’s upper airspace Area Control (ATC) and FIS were first provided by the USAFE as “CORNBEEF Control” for all military (later OAT) and civil (later GAT) flights and as of June 1957 as “Rhein Control (UAC)” at the integrated ATS unit at Birkenfeld for all civil and military traffic.

When USAFE at Rhein UAC turned over all ATS Operations at this facility, maintained by the 7424th Support Squadron of the 17th Air Force in September 1960 to BFS, the sole provider of ATS in the form of Area Control service and FIS became BFS, internally assisted by GAF ATS staff, which were only few. This military component of the BFS UAC was then called “Flugsicherungs-Bereichszentrale” (FS-Ber-Z 11/12), but a proper mandate for calling this a separate center did not exist, because of the two above mentioned ministries’ decision of 1959.

The situation changed upruptly in September 1960, when BFS assumed responsibility for ATS operations and USAFE withdrew all its controllers, leaving the control of all military flights into the hands of the civil controllers. Now only civilians were allowed, respectively forced to control all this traffic. As can easily be understood, this led to tension with the remaining GAF controllers, who were integrated into the civilian BFS teams. GAF controllers, enlisted men, NCO and officers, now had civilian supervisors, were not allowed to control traffic anymore, but had to perform assistant, coordinator or support functions only. The workload for the civil controllers increased to an irresponsible level over the next years. German soldiers only worked day shifts excluding the weekends. When the Erbeskopf area and its installations had been a sole USAFE facility before with the BFS as its tenant, it became a BFS facility in 1964 with the GAF as its only partner in ATS operations.

The Influence of EUROCONTROL on Rhein UAC

EUROCONTROL, the “European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation”, has its seat in Brussels and comprises a “Permanent Commission” and an “Air Traffic Services Agency”. Founded in 1960 its Convention came into effect in March 1963. In January 1964 the organization informed the aviation community about its structure and objectives as follows.

“The COMMISSION is composed of representatives of the Contracting Parties and its objective is to promote, in cooperation with the national military authorities, the adoption of measures and the installation and operation of facilities to ensure the safety of air navigation and an orderly and rapid flow of air traffic. Staff and facilities for the operation of the Commission are to be made available by the Agency.”

“The purpose of the AGENCY is to provide, within the airspace defined in the Convention, air traffic services for the prevention of collisions between aircraft, to ensure the orderly and rapid flow of air traffic, to provide advice and information useful for the safe and efficient conduct of flight and to notify appropriate organizations regarding aircraft in need of search and rescue aid, and assist such organizations as required.”

In the spring of 1962 the EUROCONTROL Agency submitted the so-called “MEDIATOR” plan, which foresaw an integration of civil and military ATS, in contradiction to its earlier policy. Only Germany also concluded to the same effect for its UIRs, in harmony with NATO’s 2nd ATAF (RAF) in North Germany.

In order to create a close connection to air defence they all agreed to establish these integrated units into the air defence centres at Uedem in the North and on Erbeskopf (bunker “Erwin”) in the South, practically bringing civil air traffic operations into a subordinate role. In 1963 a corresponding simulation took place at the FAA’s NAFEC test centre in Atlantic City / USA without participation of the BFS for an evaluation of this proposed concept. But its functionality failed and the move into the bunker should not take place.

On 13 February 1964 BFS informed the aviation community with NOTAM A 11/64 (NfL A) that the EUROCONTROL Agency will assume responsibility for the provision of air traffic services to air traffic in accordance with Article 3 of the Convention also in the german UIRs Hannover and Frankfurt/Rhein at FL 200 and above as of 1 March 1964. The FRG had delegated all of its upper airspace to the EUROCONTROL Agency.

Rhein Control: Operational Shortcomings and Incidents

In 1972, a report on the shortcomings of the ATS - System in the upper airspace of Germany, addressed to Department L 6 of the German Ministry for Transport, served the purpose of presentation and discussion with the “Commission on the Consultation of existing Problems in Air Navigation” and especially the air traffic services in the Federal Republic of Germany. The response to this report by the MOT, by BFS and the AFSBw was “nil” !

ANSE’s report on the ATS problems in the upper airspace to the MoT’s Schlieker Committee was the only input on this subject to the committee. It was never discussed by the committee, but instead handed to the president of BFS for further action, who in turn, also did not act on it. Thus, the elaboration and submission of the report had become meaningless. The Schlieker-Committee did not deal with upper airspace matters at all and the requirements were simply ignored by all parties involved.

In 1970 also a meeting between NATO / CEAC’s Technical Sub-Committee and IATA took place on the “Progress of Civil/Military ATS Systems in NATO – Europe Standardization”. The report quotes IATA as saying that the progress in implementing agreed ICAO controlled routes and associated procedures continues to be very slow. This is evidenced, they said, by the increasing numbers of air miss reports received by IATA and one of the major causes would be the mixture of IFR and VFR traffic above FL 200. Furthermore, that it was apparent from the review of near miss incidents, that some of them in reality were interceptions between military airplanes. IATA, therefore, re-commended that authorization for VFR flight between sunset and sunrise and above FL 200 only be granted in ex-ceptional circumstances, applicable to both civil and military flights

In 1970 the IATA regional office had received 302 air miss reports. 250 referred to NATO member states. On only 79 of these reports had IATA received a reply from the aviation administrations. The most typical causes were said to be the mixture of IFR and VFR civil & military traffic and ineffective civil/military ATC coordination. In 70% of all near misses a military aircraft was involved and in 57% the other aircraft was above FL 200. The following reply by the administration in response to a controller enquiry was typical.

Subject: AIR NAVIGATION AND THE SAFETY OF AIR TRAFFIC
Enclosed, the Frankfurt RANSU sends the letter of Mr. Frank W Fischer, ATC employee, and the respective statement of the chief of Rhein UAC to this letter. The subject matter as described by Mr. Fischer is correct and known to headquarters BFS. A solution, commensurate to the proper solution of the described problem could so far not be found by the Frankfurt RANSU, despite multiple efforts, as is also described in the statement of the chief Rhein UAC, since in this matter only changes can be initiated at higher level. The RANSU points out that the reported circumstances and situation are unacceptable, since the safety of air traffic cannot be guaranteed by the RANSU under the reported circumstances. This fact is not only a burden to controllers and supervisors, but also to the management of the unit to an unbearable degree since years. The RANSU therefore requests to undertake all possible effort for the removal of these grievances. Signed: FLENTJE, LdF, Frankfurt RANSU to HQ BFS

Nothing was corrected and what remained were hundreds of proximity reports by aircraft, one shoot-down, one mid-air collision, avoidable serious accidents of military aircraft , illegal border crossings, all in contrast to safe and orderly operations.

Professional Career & Social Welfare at Birkenfeld’s Rhein Control

Civilian ATS personnel arriving at Birkenfeld immediately felt being illegally assigned there outside german legislation as far as the performance of ATC service under foreign military regulations and to mainly military flights, developed. This situation, however, remained unclarified for all civil staff until at least 1964, when Rhein Control became an independent solely german civil operated air navigation unit, assisted by the GAF.

The integration into the teams of the responsible USAF squadrons (first the 619th TCS, then the 7424th SUPPRON) and the assignment of equivalent US military officers' rank plus military logistic support contributed to this "feeling". One was suddenly part of US military life, had to pay all expenses in US dollars and was permitted to use all military installations and facilities. To purchase and pay with US dollars required special permission from a state bank. Duty orders came from USAF supervisors. This whole arrangement became legally based on the USA & FRG state agreement only in 1959, which ceased as late as April 1968.

Whereas US military, German Air Force and BFS civil controllers enjoyed equal status under USAF facility command from June 1957 to September 1960 with BFS controllers being given equivalent US military officer status. This situation changed upruptly in September 1960, when BFS assumed responsibility for ATS operations, leaving the control of all military flights into the hands of the civil controllers.

An administrative official of BFS took care of adherence to proper german administrative governmental procedures, which were often violated, when it came to postal secrecy, correct operational incident investigation and the suppression of reports, complaints, suggestions and correspondence by Rhein Control's staff and BFS at Frankfurt. One normally was better off in dealing with USAF than with BFS superiors. This even lead to falsification of working position logs, the erasure of magnetic voice tape recordings and irresponsible operational work orders by “the office”. Private mail was opened with the assistance of the german PTT and telephones were tapped. Personal data security was an unknown term.

Active membership in the controllers professional association GATCA, union activity and chairmanship of the unit's works council apparently were too much for BFS. When the unit's staff decided to form its own works council in 1961, this move was almost considered as an attack by BFS and the required cooperation of the unit's administration with the works council proved less than minimal, turning into a formality only. Controllers became frustrated in significant numbers and the ones that had a chance to take up other ATC assignments with ICAO, BFS, EUROCONTROL or outside Europe did leave as soon as they could. The rest held through until the move of the centre to Frankfurt airport in April 1968.

However, a fact withheld from controllers was that the german government was not protecting them from consequences of operational incidents and accidents, because they were serving a military organization of a foreign nation.

Flugsicherung

Die umfassende Dokumentation über den Luftverkehrsdienst Flugsicherung. Eine Buchreihe in mehreren Bänden, die von Frank W. Fischer im Verlag der International Advisory Group Air Navigation Services (ANSA) herausgegeben wurde.